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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 25/08/2016

Accident number: 811

Accident time: 07:53

Accident Date: 06/05/2014

Where it occurred: Junction of Panj and
Vakhsh rivers, Jilikul
District, Khatlon region

Country: Tajikistan

Primary cause: Victim inattention (?)

Secondary cause: Inadequate training (?)

Class: Other

Date of main report: 12/05/2014
Name of source: Demining group

ID original source:
Organisation: [Name removed]
Mine/device: PMN AP blast and ML7

Ground condition: dry/dusty; soft
Date last modified: 25/08/2016

Date record created:
No of victims: 1

No of documents: 2

Map details
Alt. coord. system: WGS 84

Coordinates fixed by: GPS

Map east: 068° 19' 01.4" E

Map north: 37° 06' 39.5" N

Map scale: Kalai-Zail

Map series: Series 1984

Map edition: General Staff

Map sheet: 10-42-101-4 J-42-101

Map name: 1:50000

Accident Notes
visor not worn or worn raised (?)
inadequate area marking (?)
no independent investigation available (?)
inadequate training (?)

Accident report
This report was made available by the demining group in 2015. Some of the formatting and
pictures have been removed for inclusion in the DDAS. The report is reproduced below,
edited for anonymity. Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial.

1. Administrative decision of forming the board
The investigation board was established on May 06, 2014.
Internal investigation board members are as follows:
1. [Name removed], [Demining group] Country Director
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2. [Name removed], Operations Manager [Demining group] HD Tajikistan
3. [Name removed], Technical Advisor [Demining group] HD Tajikistan
External investigation board members are as follow:
1. [Name removed], Operations Manager TNMAC/UNDP
2. [Name removed], QA/QC Officer TNMAC/UNDP
3. [Name removed], QA/QC Officer TNMAC/UNDP
4. [Name removed], Director TNMAC
Board was established the same day accident have occurred, May 06, 2014 and its members
arrived to accident place for physical inspection the same day but at different times due to
different locations of investigation board members.
[Demining group] HD Tajikistan OM and TA have arrived to control point at 09:20am.
TNMAC/UNDP QA/QC officers arrived from neighbouring district Qabodiyan to control point
at 12:40pm.
TNMAC Director and TNMAC/UNDP OM came from Dushanbe and arrived to control point at
17:00pm.
2. Introduction
Accident occurred in one of remote tasks in Jilikul district (56km to nearest hospital), where
civilian team (8 deminers) was deployed. The team was supervised by Task Supervisor (TS)
[Name removed] and Team Leader (TL) [Name removed] (casualty). Due to geography and
terrain of the task team was split into two sections.
First section, controlled by TS, consisting of five deminers was recovering PMN mines
according to MF record and second section, controlled by TL, was conducting manual
Technical Survey 10x10m boxing searching for the presence of directional fragmentation
mines type MON-50. The sections were working in very close proximity but due to topography
there was no visual contact between the sections.
At 07:50AM TL announced normal ten minutes break and deminers took the rest close to their
working lanes. TS before the break was down the hill, in PMN part of the minefield, where
[Name removed], deminer had discovered a PMN mine. Upon announcement of the break TS
with 5 deminers got out from working lanes and gathered in the resting area. Three minutes
later, explosion occurred and some seconds later TL talked on the radio something like:
“[Name removed]! I am at the bank of the river, take me away!” Meanwhile, another deminer
[Name removed], approached TS and showed the direction of explosion, since he was in
upper part of minefield and saw detonating wave with TNT black smoke. TS immediately took
control of the situation and soon he realised that the casualty was in a dangerous area, some
60 metres from the safe area. TS personally cleared rescue 2m wide lane and evacuated
injured TL to the safe area. Due to significant amount of metal signals, it took almost 22
minutes to reach injured TL (54mx2m). When casualty was under first aid treatment TS
informed OM.
From 08-15am to 08-25 [Name removed], team medic, provided first aid to casualty in safe
area and prepared him for the further evacuation. 08-28am, deminers brought TL on
stretchers to control point, loaded him to ambulance and evacuated him to Dusti hospital. On
the way to hospital the ambulance stopped three times in order to make anesthetise reliever
injections to causality. Whole evacuation time from control point to hospital took 1 hour 05
minutes. [One hour 43 minutes from time of detonation.]
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Upon arrival to Dusti at 09-33, the injured was handed over to hospital doctors ([Name
removed] and [Name removed]) for further treatment. According the doctors initial conclusion,
patient was in very difficult condition and evacuation to Dushanbe, was not option at all. After
x-rays procedures and blood analysis the surgery (amputation of right leg just under the knee)
was conducted [there may be some confusion over which leg was amputated and which
required extensive surgery].
Later, same evening, with support of TNMAC Director through Ministry of Health three expert
doctors from Dusanbe arrived to Dusti for second independent opinion about health condition
of the injured. They conducted second surgery on left leg, which was broken in four places
above and under the knee. Some numbers of fragments was taken off. Patient is now very
stable, he can talk and all main life functions are normal so far.
3. History of the minefield and terrain of the land
Minefield is relatively remote (56km from Dusti Hospital) and located along Tajik-Afghan
border, in Jilikul district, Khatlon Region, South Tajikistan. The area where accident occurred
is under control of border frontier post #1 “Vakhsh”, which is located almost 9km from
accident place.
Minefield TNMAC ID is LRTM68MF1.
TNMAC Minefield record ID #60 (Russian border forces MFR ID: #48/5/1.2.3.4)
Minefield was set up on April 24, 1997 by Russian border forces. Minefield is defensive type
and was purposed to protect the border block post behind the watch tower.
Minefield is combination of several mine belts and two strikes of air delivered dispenser [PFM1 and 1S] mines.
First line of mines is directional fragmentation AP mine type MON50 (20pcs), set up via UMP3 minefield control system (the minefield control consists in arming and disabling minefield
with the aid of the control panel). Mines are connected to each other and execution units via
subsurface cable. Distance between each mine indicated in MFR is 30m. Estimated area of
MON50 was technically surveyed by 10x10 boxes
Two belts of AP mines PMN type. Due to direction of already discovered mines it is most
likely that in combination, these two mine belts form L-profile shape line of PMN mines,
fencing a semi-island. Each PMN mine is equipped with an anti-lifting device beneath it –ML7.
PMNs are set up in two rows (zigzag mining). Distance between mines in the row is 1m.
Distance between rows is 1,5m. Total number of PMN mines equipped with ML7 is 80pcs.
The accident occurred by activation PMN equipped with ML7 by stepping on it.
PFM strike. According MFR there are two strikes of air delivered dispensers mine type PFM.
Each strike consists of 72 PFM mines. Totally, there are 144 PFM mine registered and
indicated in MFR. Normally, each PFM strike covers ellipse shape in size of 15-18m by 2025m. According to MFR location of the strike is close to small forest on the bank of river.
Reference and orientation points indicated in MFR are watching tower “Bashnya” and border
stone (land mark) #118. Additionally, it is indicated in MFR that minefield starts in 10m behind
the fence towards Panj River.
Minefield is located at the bank of junction of two rivers (delta): Panj and Vakhsh. The area is
more or less flat with insignificant hills. However, in some parts of the minefield visibility is
limited due to natural obstacles (3-5m high hills, small gorges, and separate bushes, high and
dense reeds). Originally, vegetation is mixed by thorn bushes on the slope area and dense
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reeds along the bank of the Vakhsh River. However most part of vegetation is not considered
as big deal for operations.
The weather during May 06, 2014 was clear and sunny. Ground was soft and dry.
Only one manual demining team was working at the task. The operational progress of the
task so far is as follow:
Start date of operations:

April 28, 2014

Cleared by detector MineLab F3S: 612sqm
TS lanes: 2512sqm
Items discovered and destroyed: PMN x12; ML7 x12
4. Location
The accident occurred outside of cleared and marked area, in the bank of Panj River, just 3m
away from water line.
TL left his helmet and map case in the cleared area (found later in systematic technical
survey lane), stepped over the marking and proceeded passing through the uncleared
dangerous area towards to river. The foot prints on the ground are clearly visible where TL
stepped over the marking. The distance (straight line) between this place and place of
explosion is 77m.
The length of rapid rescue lane (straight line) which was cleared by Task Supervisor in order
to reach injured Team Leader from the nearest safe spot was 54m.
5. Time and date of the accident
Accident occurred at 07-53am on May 06, 2014.
07-50 task supervisor and team leader announced second regular 10 minutes break.
As to witnesses’ statements (task supervisors, medic, drivers, and deminers) the explosion
was heard after 2-3 minutes of break announcement.
6. Timings of accident day [small conflict with earlier text]:
04:30: Team wake up at camp in border frontier post #1, morning routine.
05:30: Arrival of team to control point;
05:50: Daily task and safety briefing by TS and TL.
06:00: Start of operations in the field.
06:50

First rest 10 minutes break of daily routine announced by TL.

07:00

Second working hour in the field;

07:50

Second rest 10 minutes break of daily routine announced by TL.

07:53

Accident has occurred;

08:15

TS cleared rescue access lane and reached casualty;

08:16

OM was informed about accident;

08:25

Team medic finished first aid to casualty;

08:28

Casualty reached ambulance;

09:32

Casualty arrived at the hospital and was admitted to the emergency ward
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7. Casualty Background
Name: [the Victim]
Internal Victim ID: #038
Age: 27
DoB and sex: July 05 1986, Male
Job Title: Team Leader
History of Employment: Deminer (November 10, 2010 - December 31, 2012)
Team Leader (January 01, 2013 to date)
Previously disciplinary action against him: None
Compensation: Not yet known [Not made known]
Protection issued: Frontal apron. Helmet with [short] visor
Protection used: Frontal apron. Helmet found left inside the cleared area
8. Personnel present at time of accident
During accident whole team was in the minefield. Below is names and positions of staff during
accident:
Minefield:
Task Supervisor
[Name removed], (down part of minefield)
Team Leader [The Victim] (injured)
Deminer
[Name removed] (upper part of minefield)
Deminer
[Name removed] (upper part of minefield)
Deminer
[Name removed] (upper part of minefield)
Deminer
[Name removed] (down part of minefield)
Deminer
[Name removed] (down part of minefield)
Deminer
[Name removed] (down part of minefield)
Deminer
[Name removed] (down part of minefield)
Deminer
[Name removed] (down part of minefield)
Control Point:
Team Medic
[Name removed]
Ambulance Driver
[Name removed]
Driver
[Name removed]
9. Actions Leading to the Accident
Accident has occurred by activating blasting AP mine equipped with ML7.
After announcing of second regular 10 minutes break, TL took off helmet, left it in the cleared
1m wide line between TS boxes, stepped over the marking and entered uncleared area. TL
has passed 77 meters of uncleared dangerous area and already approached bank of the
river. Just 3 metres before water line he stepped on mine and detonation has occurred.
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[The picture shows the accident site]
This is an example of violation and breaking of primary safety rules and procedures listed in
SOP and NMAS (chapter#2: Safety).
10. Procedures used (reference to the SOP)
N/A
11. Personal Protective Equipment
Casualty was found in his flak jacket [frontal apron]. Flak jacket Rofi type was put on during
the explosion correctly. As to team medic and deminers assisting in providing first aid all belts
were fixed and locked properly. Textile cover of the lower part of the flak jacket that protect
perineum of the body are burnt and broken. However, aramid fiber inside is not harmed.
Genital organs of the casualty as to hospital doctors are in normal function.

Helmet was found left inside the cleared area later on, almost 90 straight meters away from
place of accident. Helmet was in good condition.
American WELCO desert boots were issued to TL in the beginning of demining operational
season. Lower part of right boots including sole had disappeared up to lacer part of the boots
as a result of mine explosion. Heel of the left boot was broken. [These boots are not sold as
providing any blast protection, see below.]
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12. Monitoring process during clearance
First internal QA in the task was conducted by OM and TA on 28/04/2014.
It was start day of operations in the minefield. Small comments regarding lay-out of control
point futures (task brief board; location of toilet; location of field explosive storage) were given
by TA [Name removed].
All comments are indicated and documented in [Demining group] internal QA form and
attached to Task Folder.
All recorded comments were not negatively linked to direct supervision of TS and TL.
During monitoring the task it was noticed that team doctor was not aware about position of
two deminers in lower part of the minefield. This fault was indicated and commented in QA
form by TA. Later TS, TL, and team medic were briefed about constant updates between TS,
TL, and medic in case of any change of deminers’ positions in the field.
Same day CASEVAC exercise was practised. Scenario was snake bite of deminer [Name
removed], who was working in upper part of the minefield discovering presence of MON50
mines via systematic TS (10x10 boxing). Team medic approached deminer in 3 minutes.
Further first aid and evacuation to ambulance was done correctly. TL was leading the
CASEVAC process in calm and confident manner.
Later, on 05/05/2014, just day before accident, OM and TA were visiting the task again. It was
second monitoring visit from the one week of opening the task.
At the end of the working day planned demolition of found 3 PMN mines with ML7 under it
was conducted by TS in assistance of TL. Demolition was done successfully and in
accordance with SOP. Leading of demolition was recorded by TA.
Additionally, TS conducted QA of the team and filled out his monitoring form on 29/04/14 and
on 03/05/14. No negative comments were registered.
13. Medevac process
Medevac map for minefield was developed and prepared jointly with team medic [Name
removed] and TS on April 28, 2014.Distance and time to hospital according medevac plan is
as follow: 55km, 01 hour 15 minutes.
Casualty was delivered from uncleared to safe area after 22 minutes after explosion occurred.
Medic assessed the casualty, assured that injure is conscious, and provided immediate aid as
follow:


Stopped bleeding of the right lower extremity;



Did initial de-bridement of the wound and bandaged it;
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Did splinting on the right leg;



Fixed neck fixator;



Did anesthetise reliever injections to casualty (trimeperidine hydrochloride)

All this, including taking off flak jacket, boots, and cutting pants took 10 minutes.
Later, casualty was fixed by belts on the stretchers and was placed into ambulance at control
point (3 minutes).
Later, on the way to hospital in ambulance medic did splinting of the left broken leg.
Additionally, medic checked blood pulsation and temperature of the casualty. Additional pain
killer and antibiotics injections were made as well.
After one hour and 5 minutes of driving, ambulance arrived to hospital and hand over casualty
to local doctors.
14. Collected evidences from the accident site
Hole of detonation was discovered some 50cm to the place where TS found injured TL was
laying down. Diameter of the hole was 35cm with a depth of 30cm.
Rumpled vegetation indicate position of TL in the ground. Blood on the grass was visible
where position of amputated foot was.
Some pieces of fragments of PMN and ML7 mines as well as part of the boot together with
small pieces of the foot were found in radius of 1 meter from the explosion hole.
Further detailed evidences of accident will be updated upon reopening the task in close
future.
In the safe area where injured TL was rendered first aid, his flak jacket and boots were found.
Signs of provision of first aid to casualty were visible:


Medic gloves



Small bottle of medical alcohol



Packages of used bandages



Syringes

In addition, all picture will be attached to this report.
Foot print of TL boots in the place we he crossed marking towards uncleared area and place
of accident.
15. Chain of events
04:30

Team wake up at camp in border frontier post #1, morning routine.

05:30

Arrival of team to control point; Loading off and preparing of equipment;

05:50 Daily task and safety briefing by TS and TL; TS divided team into two sections and
gave instructions to deminers;
06:00

Start of operations in the field.

06:50

First rest 10 minutes break of daily routine announced by TL.

07:00

Second working hour in the field;
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07:50 TL announced second regular break to team. All team (8 deminers) and TS went out
working lanes.
07:51
lane;

TL took off his helmet and left together with map case and pen in the 1m wide TS

07:52 TL stepped over marking and proceed to place of accident by passing uncleared
dangerous area towards the bank of the river.
07:53

TL almost approached river and activated mine by stepping on it. Explosion occurred.

08:15

TS cleared rescue access lane and reached casualty;

08:16

OM was informed about accident by TS via phone;

08:25

Team medic finished first aid to casualty;

08:28

Casualty reached ambulance;

08:30

TS gathered team in the CP and closed down the minefield;

09:20

OM and TA arrived to CP;

09:32

Casualty arrived at the hospital and was admitted to the emergency ward.

16. Accident investigation
Investigation of accident was conducted same day in one hour after explosion.
First, upon arrival to control point OM and TS were briefed by TS about accident.
TS shortly briefed: WHO? WHEN? HOW? Explanation of position and actions of each team
member during and after explosion we given.
Team members were asked at control point to submit own statements about accident in
writing.
Investigation team reached place of explosion by using rapid rescue access line cleared by
TS earlier.
Physical inspection of the area, included exploring of fire hole, collecting of evidences at the
place of explosion, first aid place, and taking coordinates and measuring of the distances.
Later, external TNMAC investigation team arrived to task. In presence of OM, and TA,
TNMAC team was briefed by TS about accident. Further, investigation team proceed into the
place of accident.
Task staff were interviewed by TNMAC, appropriate written statements were submitted as
well.
Pictures of all evidence were taken and attached to report. [Held on record.]
17. Trials
N/A
18. Conclusion
Accident occurred by personal mistake of victim. Casualty violated primary safety rules by
intentionally and voluntarily breaching marking and entering deeply into uncleared dangerous
area, directly into mine belt.
07:51am TL left his helmet in lane end entered into hazardous area. During 2-3 minutes TL
managed to pass almost 77 metres. Implicit speed of TL’s itinerary was either normal walking
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(approximately 30 meters per minute) or faster (achieved place of accident early and spent
some time stopped). TL activated mine by pressure of right leg. During explosion he fell down
close to fire hole. He was conscious. In the lying position TL managed to use radio and call
TS. In 22 minutes TL was rescued from hazardous area to medic’s point and later, evacuated
to hospital.
As to Team Leader, the reason he passed uncleared unsafe area was to warn Afghans to do
not come close since deminers are working in the field. Once, couple days before, TL passed
the same path to the bank of the river using metal detector. That time he saw three armed
Afghans fishing close to our side. Again, as to him the reason he entered and walked
dangerous area was to inform Afghans to do not approach our deminers.
19. Recommendation
Remind, and if required, increase field staff knowledge of safety procedures and respect of
marking system in accordance to SOP (chapter #2: safety; and chapter #4: marking);
Increase supervision of any staff movements in the minefield up to as high level, as it
possible.
Develop daily safety brief form to be signed by TL and TS on daily basis prior to work in the
field.
Increase command skills of at least one deminer in each team by practice of CASEVAC
exercises with scenario as TL is casualty.
Taking into consideration the nature of accident, there is no need to conduct refresher training
on demining procedures to team, however, at least one day off is recommended for accident
stress recovery.
Temporary suspend accident minefield.
20. Action Points
Minefield was suspended the same day. Team was sent to camp for one day off.
All field staff was briefed about accident and its reasons.
Separate learning session only for task supervisors and team leaders on increasing of safety
in the task was conducted.
CASEVAC exercises with supervisors as casualty will be conducted during the year as well
as CASEVAC with deminer.

Victim Report
Victim number: 1014

Name: [Name removed]

Age: 27

Gender: Male

Status: supervisory

Fit for work: not known

Compensation: Not made available

Time to hospital: 103 minutes

Protection issued: Frontal apron; Long
visor

Protection used: Frontal apron

Summary of injuries: minor Arms; severe Leg
AMPUTATION/LOSS: Leg Below knee
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COMMENT: No formal medical report was made available A psychological report is
appended. Amputation of "right leg just under the knee" may mean that it is not possible for
the victim to use a lower leg prosthetic.

Psychological Assessment Report
Patient: [Name removed]
Date/Time: 20.05.2014, 14.30-15.30
Location: Traumatology Ward, National Clinical Hospital
Psychological assessment of [the Victim] took place in the Traumatology Ward, National
Clinical Hospital in the presence of his older brother and other patients based in the same
ward.
[the Victim] was conscious during interview and answered the questions with low voice, little
reluctantly and curt answers. His mental capacity, volume of knowledge and vocabulary are
scarce. Often his brother suggested him the answers, who is based in the ward together with
him. [The Victim]’s physical appearance is observed adynamic and malnutrition. His behavior
is adequate, but the frame of his mood is lowered.
His flesh-back memory is unmarked. He is indifferent with his future, as he said “he doesn’t
think about the future, as the future depends on his health statement”. He doesn’t show
particular interest towards upcoming prosthesis.
[The Victim]’s biography data: He grew up in large family with 7 children; he is the second
child in the family. His father died at early age, while his single-mother brought them up. Due
to family difficulty conditions, [the Victim] was rolled to boarding school and completed 6-9
grades with main difficulties. During 2006-2008 [the Victim] served the Tajik army, while
during 2008-2010 he worked as salesperson at market selling vegetables. Following
[Demining group] staff recruitment for deminers [the Victim] joined [Demining group] in 2010,
since 2013 he has been promoted to team leader position.
Memory degradation is observed. [The Victim] is married for the second time, but does not
remember the wedding date. He lived for 16 months with the first spouse, but divorced as the
spouse left the house. His second marriage is one month only. During interview it was
obvious that [the Victim] is indifferent and irresponsible towards important life events, such as
marriage – he thinks it is not important to see the bride before the marriage and believes that
“most important his mom to like the bride, since the would-be spouse would live the family”
Complaints: Sleep disorder is observed. He under-sleeps and wakes up early. He complains
that is not used to sleep on his back due to trauma, amputation and pain syndrome. His
brother mentioned that he periodically flinches when he is asleep.
Regarding mine accident [the Victim] mentioned the following: On 6 May 2014 the mine
clearance started as usual at 6 o’clock in the morning. The team was assigned to clear the
minefield since 26 April 2014. At 7:50 during the ten-minutes break, [the Victim] headed
towards the river as he saw some Afghans who were fishing in boats. Accordingly [the Victim]
wanted to urge them to keep off the Tajik side in order not to distract other deminers working
in the spot. In other hand, later [the Victim] said that he wanted to warn the Afghans that it is
minefield and to avoid the mine accidents. According to [the Victim] the Afghans periodically
have been crossing the borders.
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[The Victim] was irresponsible on his action: [the Victim] did not use metal detector when he
headed towards the river. [The Victim] replied that a day before he cleared the track with
metal detector, therefore he did not use it when he headed towards the river the next day.
However, [the Victim] mentioned that he made additional 2 steps towards the river when
warning the Afghan fishermen, then on return when he made a step back, the mine exploded.
After explosion, [the Victim] did not lose conscious and fell down on his back. He saw the
traumatic injuries of his right leg and immediately called up the paramedic and task supervisor
with radio.
After mine accident, [the Victim] was delivered to Kumsangir district hospital where he
received necessary emergency operation and treatment.
The interview with doctor revealed that [the Victim] was aggressive and impatient during the
first week of hospitalization, he constantly complained about inadequate care by medical
personnel and required excessive attention. However he calmed down during next weeks of
hospitalization. Following the treatment plan, [the Victim] will have operation on repositioning
of lower left leg bones and skin surgery on 21 May 2014.
Family interview on telephone (older brother and uncle) – It revealed that [the Victim] was
always laconic, calm, complaisant and had difficulties with school performance.
Conclusion: The mine accident trauma and leg amputation of one-third of right lower leg and
bone fracture of left leg. The condition is acute post-accident street.
The personality, psychological and characterological aspects of [the Victim] and his low level
of individual development are explained by the particulars of individual development and upbringing.
Recommendation – Re-assessment by psychologist in separate ward after the surgery.
Recommendation for [Demining group]: To consider psychological consultations during
recruitment of new deminers.
Prepared by:
M.D., PhD. [Name removed] Disability Support Unit Officer, TNMAC

Statements
Statements of the staff who were in the task when accident has happened were written and
submitted to OM same day. Later on, upon casualty’s health condition improved, his
statement will be attached to report as well [it is appended below].
Task Supervisor:
I, {Demining group] TS [Name removed], at 5:30 am, with all colleagues left our base, and
went to working place. In the control point I briefed all deminers and TL about safety rules,
and at 6:00 am, we started our work.
Three deminers with TL were working in one side of the minefield, and I with five other
deminers was working in other side of the minefield. During the work I was called by deminer
[Name removed]. When I reach his working lane, he informed me that he find a mine, then I
pulled out deminer from his working lane. In this moment TL [Name removed] announced
second break at 7:50 am. I was sitting with the other deminers. After 2-3 minutes, in one side
of the minefield occurred detonation. Then I saw that TL blow up outside of the field, and I
informed everybody about what’s happened. I took deminer [Name removed]’s detector and
start to clear access lane towards casualty TL [The Victim]. Behind me in safety distance 25
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meters, deminer was making marking. I took the casualty and together with deminers we
pulled out him to the safe area. I informed OM about accident through other Task Supervisor
[Name removed], since OM’s as well as TA’s mobile were outside the coverage network.
Then we put the casualty into the ambulance and send to the hospital. All this activities
started from 7:50 am, and continued till 8:25 am. After it, I collect all deminers in control point,
and I closed deminer [Name removed]’s working lane, because he found a mine in his
working lane. After one hour OM together with TA are arrived to the control point.
I went with them to the field to show to them place of accident, and to tell details.
Deminer:
I, [Demining group] deminer team #1 [Name removed], on date 06.05.2014 woke up and at
5:30 am, we left our base, and went to working place. We arrived to the field at 5:50, then TL
[Name removed] and TS [Name removed] briefed us. We signed in safety briefing form and
at 6:00 am, we start our work. TL [Name removed] with three deminers has started work in
one side of the minefield and TS [Name removed] with five deminers has started work in
other side of the minefield.
After announced second break on radio by TL [Name removed] , passed couple minutes and
we heard detonation. We stand up from our place and we heard TL [The Victim’s] voice from
one side of the field. On that moment I gave my detector and small shovel to TS [Name
removed], and he went towards TL [The Victim]. After cleaning access lane, we pull him out
together with other deminers to the safe area to the medic. After rendering first medical aid,
we put him into the ambulance and send to the hospital.
Then TS [Name removed] told us to take all equipment, we took our equipment and after one
hour OM and TA are arrived, and together with TS [Name removed] went to the accident
place.
Deminer:
I, [Demining group] deminer team #1 [Name removed], on date 06.05.2014 woke up and had
a breakfast. At 5:30 am, we left our base, and went to working place. Then TL [Name
removed] and TS [Name removed] briefed us, and then we entered to the minefield and start
our work.
Me, and two deminers were working in upper part of the minefield and TL [Name removed]
was with us. TS and the rest of deminers were working in downer part of the minefield. At
7:50 was second break, we were sitting together, then we heard detonation and TS [Name
removed] informed us that TL [the Victim] blow up. I went to the medical point, to assist medic
to bring his medical bag. Together with medic we provide first medical aid and transport up to
the ambulance.
Team Medic:
I, [Name removed], on date 06.05.2014 at 5:30 am, with colleagues left our base, and went
to working place. In control point TS and TL briefed deminers about safety rules. At 6:00 am,
we started our work. TL [Name removed] with three deminers has started work in one side of
the minefield and TS [Name removed] with five deminers has started work in other side of the
minefield.
During second break occurred detonation, TS [Name removed] informed me, and I put my
PPE and helmet, took medical bag and went to the minefield. Inside the minefield, deminer
[Name removed] met me and led to the casualty. I did first medical aid, then we put the
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casualty into the ambulance and went to the Kumsangir central hospital. In the hospital I
handover the casualty to traumatologist [Name removed] and surgeon [Name removed].
Ambulance Driver:
I, [Demining group] ambulance driver [Name removed], on date 06.05.2014 woke up at 4:30
am, and had a breakfast. At 5:30 am, we left our base, and went to working place. At 5:50 TL
[Name removed] briefed us, and at 6:00 am, deminers entered to the minefield and start their
work.
I, with medic [Name removed] and field driver [Name removed] remained in control point.
The end of first working hour was at 6:50 am, and TL N [Name removed] announced break,
and after 10 minutes at 7:00, deminers started their work. At 7:50 am, TL [Name removed]
announced break, and during 2-3 minutes detonation is occurred, then medic was informed
that TL [the Victim] blow up on mine. Medic put his PPE, helmet, took medical bag and went
to casualty side. I, with field driver [Name removed] prepared ambulance. Medic with
deminers and TS took the casualty and brought up to the ambulance. They put the casualty
into the ambulance and we went to the hospital. During transportation we stopped three
times, and medic provides medical aid. The distance 55 km, was passed in one hour and five
minutes, and casualty was transported to Dusti hospital. In hospital, medical staff met us and
we hand over the casualty to them. With me were two deminers and medic [Name removed].
Team Driver:
I, [Name removed], on date 06.05.2014 woke up at 4:30 am, and had a breakfast. We left our
base, and arrived to working place At 5:30 am. At 5:50 TL [Name removed] briefed us, and at
6:00 am, deminers entered to the minefield and start their work.
I, with medic [Name removed] and ambulance driver [Name removed] remained in control
point. The end of first working hour was at 6:50 am, and by radio TL [Name removed]
announced break, and after 10 minutes at 7:00, deminers started their work. At 7:50 am, TL
[Name removed] announced break, and during 2-3 minutes detonation is occurred, then
medic was informed by radio that TL [the Victim] blow up on mine. Medic put his PPE, helmet,
took medical bag and went to casualty side. I, with ambulance driver prepared ambulance.
Medic with deminers and TS took the casualty and brought up to the ambulance. They put the
casualty into the ambulance and ambulance went to the hospital.
After one hour, OM and TA are arrived.
Team Leader (casualty):
I, [Demining group] TL team #1 [Name removed] on 06/05/2014 at 7:50 am, announced
second break. After announcing second break, I saw how two Afghans coming to our side by
boat for fishing. I went to the riverside to turn them back. I went through un-cleared area to
the riverside, and when I reach them, I told to them that they are not allowed to be here,
because we conducting mine clearance operations and they turn back. I was waiting while
they will move further. When they moved, I turn to go back to the deminers and suddenly
detonation is occurred. After detonation I saw that I don’t have right foot. I call by handheld
radio TS [Name removed]. [Name removed] with using metal detector cleared access lane
towards me. When he reaches me, he took me from my shoulders and pull out into the
cleared access lane 2-3 meters, after that other deminers helped him. They put me on a
stretcher and took me to the medic. Medic provides to me first medical aid, and together with
other deminers put me into the ambulance.
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Before that, Afghans were sailing to our side once more, about on 05/03/2014. At that time
using metal detector I reached them, I told to them that here is a minefield and we conducting
mine clearance operations and I turn them back.

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as “Victim inattention” because the victim
deliberately walked through the uncleared area to the riverbank, knowing that this was
hazardous. Having searched along a path to the river quickly on a previous occasion, the
evidence in the psychological report shows that he believed he could walk along the same
route safely, but then stepped a little closer to the river than he had when searching. The fact
that he left his visor behind and did not take the direct route followed by his rescuers seems to
support this version of events. Had he marked the route he took when he searched the first
time, he might not have unwittingly overstepped the searched ground.
If he was moving to warn Afghan fishermen away from the area it is hard not to feel some
sympathy with him. He was, however, breaking the rules that he should have known it was his
duty as a Supervisor to always obey, so the secondary cause is listed as “Inadequate
training”. While the psychological assessment in the Medical Report was conducted in less
than ideal conditions and seems remarkably harsh, the doctor’s implied conclusion that the
Victim was inadequately equipped to be a supervisor may have been correct.
The high quality and transparency of the internal demining group accident investigation is
commended once again.
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